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ABSTRACT
Crowdsourcing Consciousness:
You Think, Therefore I Am
by
Justin M. Campbell
Utah State University, 2018
Capstone Mentor: Dr. Charlie Huenemann
Department: Philosophy , Psychology
The challenge to understand consciousness is a centuries-old interdisciplinary research program .
The search entails fundamental questions about our nature - the desire to understand who we
are has been around for nearly as long as experience itself. It is also one of the most important
questions we can ask; meaning itself is predicated on having some sort of conscious experiencer
for whom something can matter. Given the magnitude and intractability of explaining the
paradox of how consciousness can be at once the most obvious thing in the universe, and also the
most inaccessible, the endeavor is a tremendous undertaking . Until somewhat recently, there has
been little cross-talk between these disciplines ; and in the absence of collaboration, a territorial
dispute has emerged. The purpose of this thesis is two-fold: first, to trace a narrative thread
across the history of thought by exploring philosophical theories dating back to ancient Greece,
through the authoritatively scientific thought of the modem day. The second aim of this project is
one of consilience, wherein by starting a dialogue between two approaches , that of science and
philosophy , sincere progress can be made. In conclusion , the thesis ends with a provocation:
much of our intimate experience is crowdsourced, and we are inescapably social.
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1

"Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery. A mystery is a
phenomenon that people don't know how to think about - yet. There have been
other great mysteries: the mystery of the origin of the universe, the mystery of life
and reproduction, the mystery of the design to be found in nature, the mysteries of
time, space, and gravity. These were not just areas of scientific ignorance, but of
utter bajjlement and wonder. We do not yet have the final answers to any of the
questions of cosmology and particle physics , molecular genetics and evolutionary
theory, but we do know how to think about them. The mysteries haven't vanished,
but they have been tamed. They no longer overwhelm our efforts to think about
the phenomena, because now we know how to tell the misbegotten questions from
the right questions, and even if we turn out to be dead wrong about some of the
currently accepted answers, we know how to go about looking for better answers.
With consciousness, however, we are still in a terrible muddle. Consciousness
stands alone today as a topic that often leaves even the most sophisticated
thinkers tongue-tied and confused. And, as with all the earlier mysteries, there are
many who insist -

and hope -

that there will never be a demystification of

consciousness .
Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991)
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Consciousness is an enigma. The deep-seated feeling of being a conscious agent engaging
with the world is unshakably familiar - above all else, we carry around an intimate sense that
there is something it is like to be us. We organically navigate a world of choices and sensations,
and yet, despite being seemingly self-evident, these experiences are also the most inaccessible to
the outside observer. The qualities of our direct experience escape any measurable description;
consciousness is, at once, both lucid and obscure. Paradoxically, the first-person privilege that
allows for an awareness of our own conscious experiences is the very same privilege that blocks
our access to other's experiences.
Wherein lies the disconnect? Given the ease with which we naturally engage with and
experience the world, one might expect that the contents of that experience would be outright
transparent. However, this is simply not the case. In this very moment, for example, I can smell
the aroma of freshly-brewed coffee. The scent has filled the room with a toasty and inviting
warmth. But this account pales in comparison to the richness of the actual experience. The
description of warmth and the feeling of warmth are fundamentally disparate concepts. By the
same token, it may prove impossible to describe color to those who have been blind since birth;
if you try to do so, you will find that the perception has an ineffable quality that evades any sort
of concrete explanation. The private nature of these experiential qualities, or qualia, are beyond
our ability to clearly communicate. No additional information about objective properties seems
capable of overcoming this divide.
What is it about qualia that makes them so inaccessible? When mounting a search, it
helps to know both what you are looking for and how best to go about locating that thing. After
all, how else would you know when you had found it? For qualia, it appears we know neither.

3
The most direct approach seems to be through the neurosciences, but this approach soon meets
the obstacle that observing brain activity and experiencing brain activity are not wholly
congruent. At a basic level, brain activity is largely observable changes in electrochemical potentials within neurons -

driven by detectable, physical

much like the actions of any other

mechanical system. But observing this does not equal the experience that lies "within" that
machine .
Imagine you were able to step into such a system and monitor its operation from within.
You may witness these functions arising from mechanical causes (i.e., the firing of electrical
signals and shunting of blood flow), more deserving of attention are the functions you are unable
to see. Our thoughts and emotions certainly have a neural signature of brain activity-

they arise from some sort

although the simple act of observing this activity seems to bring us no closer

to the actual experience. All we ever see are the mechanical causes; the quality of the emotion ,
content of the thought, or richness of the percept are out of reach. This explanatory gap was first
highlighted by Gottfried Leibniz, the German mathematician, and philosopher; bridging this gap
has been a major obstacle to the scientific study of consciousness ever since.
Many other philosophers have called attention to this epistemic rift. One notably
persuasive application was articulated by the philosopher Frank Jackson's thought experiment:
"Mary the Color Scientist". Suppose, he argues, there lives a woman named Mary, who has spent
her entire life studying the mechanisms of color perception. She has been incredibly successful,
and knows all that can be known about the physical properties within the wide spectrum of
colors; in detail, she can describe the interaction between different wavelengths of light and the
optics of the eye, the neurophysiology underlying each percept, and even how the brain
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processes that information . There is, however, one important caveat: she has never actually seen
any colors at all. Mary, for her entire life, was raised in an isolated room completely devoid of
color . If she were later able to escape that environment and step outside, what would her
experience be? Would you expect her to gaze at the blue sky and unremarkably claim "of course
that is blue", or rather, exclaim, "Wow! I never imagined blue would look like that"?
Viscerally, some are drawn to the idea that this is in fact new information, a raw

experience, that no amount of reading textbooks could have prepared her for. Notice however,
that if her knowledge of color's physical properties were truly complete , her conceptual
understanding would be absolute . Even still, it seems she is able to gain the previously unknown
infonnation about the subjective experience of what color is like.
The merits of this common belief have since been challenged, though , despite the
absence of any present consensus among philosophers, the thought experiment is powerful in its
ability to cast light on the intuition that objective information alone paints an incomplete picture
of the world. We must leave room for conscious experience.

A Hard Problem Indeed
"It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience ... It is widely
agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good
explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise
to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet
it does . "
David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (1996)
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If the qualities of our experience exist in some fashion outside of the physical acts we
directly observe, are they always necessary? In asserting that they are distinct and supplemental,
one might reasonably ask whether they may be left out entirely . In other words, is it possible to
conceive of a being in which their mental function remains intact, but thoroughly lacks any sort
of subjective experience?
An early proponent of this line of inquiry was David Chalmers, who likewise wondered if
what he termed a "Philosophical Zombie" was conceivable . These zombies supposedly bore an
outward expression that was indistinguishable from their normal human counterparts; they could
report on the experiences they were "having", their preferences, and desires. Beyond the surface,
however, it was all a facade; there was no true consciousness, rather, just the product of cleverly
programmed responses.
Chalmers concedes that this thought experiment may be implausible reason to believe that these zombies are among us -

we have no

yet the very notion that this scenario

appears conceivable suggests that subjective phenomenal properties may be separated from the
outwardly visible psychological properties (e.g., expressions of thoughts and desires). Science as
a whole has made significant strides towards understanding these psychological properties; our
understanding of the biological and chemical processes which allow the brain to function has
grown tremendously. There are certainly many questions left to answer, but these are "easy"
relative to the challenge presented by the other aspect of our experience: the phenomenal
properties . Providing a scientific account of the mind's subjective contents are the real task worth
pursuing, the Hard Problem of our time as Chalmers describes it.
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The Roots of Consciousness

"Dualism makes the problem insoluble; materialism denies the existence of any
phenomenon to study, and hence of any problem"
John R. Searle (2002)
Matter and Soul
For centuries, philosophers and theologians alike have echoed the sentiment that mind
and body are distinct; the suggestion of an afterlife implies that there is some part of you that
transcends bodily death (i.e., an immortal soul). The roots of this idea can be traced to the works
of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, who in his Phaedo, posited the existence of the Forms
- a sort of eternal substance which exists in some realm beyond the material world. Whereas
physical objects may have imperfections, the Forms were perfect and absolute. The Forms were
thought to be of a different substance, one in which concepts of shape, size, and quantity do not
apply. Since the Forms were supposedly immaterial, and the intellect was thought to gain
knowledge through comprehension of these forms, Plato argued that the two may have an
intimate connection which unites them after death. 1
Plato's account is the first to delineate the world into two distinct types of things:
physical substances (e.g., material objects) and mental substances (e .g., Forms) . This theory,
which developed into what is known as substance dualism, was widely influential. Of the later
contemporaries who would come to be associated with this view, few were as prominent as the
French mathematician and philosopher, Rene Descartes.

This assertion of the relationship between intellect and soul originated from a three-part series
of arguments designed to prove the soul's immortality written in the Phaedo (Lorenz, 2009).
1
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Like Plato, Descartes thought the world was composed of two substances: matter and
mind (Hatfield, 2016). The familiar objects of our experience (e.g., trees, books, animals) are
composed of matter, or res extensa. In contrast, mind, res cogitans, is the essential property
which thinks and unites our experience; the part responsible for the feeling that there is a "you"
somewhere in the body -

allegedly located within pineal gland. It is this latter substance which

makes humans unique.

The Mind is Matter
The central issue at the heart of substance dualism is explaining how these two
incompatible substances interact. As conscious beings we feel agency over our choices; the
explanation offered by Descartes is that somehow the mind has the power and authority to cause
changes in matter. When pressed for the details of how this interaction takes place, he offers little
more than obscurities. The intricacies of this question are deeply problematic for the dualist.
Take, for example, a game of billiards. Obviously, two material objects can interact the cue striking a ball, or balls impacting each other - but how could this movement, the
outcome of a physical collision, be caused in the absence of a material force? Even the less
visible forces, like gravity, amount to the attraction and repulsion of matter at the atomic scale.
Descartes and other substance dualists, are faced with the challenge of explaining how it is that
matter and mind, two irreconcilable substances, can somehow influence each other. This well
known objection has been called the Mind-Body Problem.
Absent any spooky, supernatural phenomenon, the Mind-Body Problem appears
impossible to circumvent, and may perhaps be fatal to the theory of substance dualism. This
criticism isn't limited to substance dualists alone, however; any theory which posits some
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immaterial substance or force alongside the material must explain how it is the two interface.
Some contemporary theorists seem to have found a solution to the Mind-Body Problem: deny
there is a problem altogether.
The materialist camp challenges the fundamental dualist notion that there exists more
than matter in the world. Instead, they propose something akin to: "what you see is all there is".
After all, if you can explain the interaction without appealing to otherworldly mystical forces,
why leave room for them? The feeling that there really is something more, an immaterial self
apart from the body, amounts to little more than a trick, an illusion the brain plays on itself
(Baggini, 2011). This mental trick certainly is a persuasive one, but you need not abandon
conscious experience when you side with the materialists .
Matter may be all that exists, though its presence alone does not generate consciousness;
a heap of cells and tissues don't make a person for the same reason that you cannot drive to
Tucson with only the parts of a car engine. What really matters is how the parts are arranged,

what/unction they are able to perform together . Most modern materialists are in fact
functionalists - asserting that once you have explained the various functions the mind is able to
perform, you will have also explained consciousness itself.
By this account, our conscious experience is entirely the result of the complex interaction
taking place between the nearly 100 billion neurons within the brain. This view doesn't deny
there remains a great deal of mystery about the mind, though it asserts that these questions are, in
principle, knowable; the mystery is not a supernatural one, but rather one that asks us to marvel
at the remarkable intricacy of the system.
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An exemplary functionalist, Daniel Dennett, garnered his fame by laying a foundation
through which we may begin to scientifically think about consciousness in this fashion. In his
seminal book "Consciousness Explained'' he proposed the Multiple Drafts Model (2001). This
novel framework challenged the notion of a singular location where consciousness "comes
together", often denounced as the Cartesian Theater, and instead suggested that there are many
possible experiences being assembled in parallel. The ongoing processing of inputs and outputs
is analogous to constructing many possible drafts to a story. When one of the drafts is
"published", or allowed to generate an action, then the story, the experience, is made concrete .
Functionalist theories may do a better job of ushering the pseudoscience out of the
picture, but at what cost? This lens, while successful in filtering out superstitious ideas, also
reduced consciousness to something far more lackluster; by Dennett's account, qualia did not
pose much of an interesting challenge at all -

since qualia, as described by his critics, does not

actually exist. (Dennett, 2002). Dennett's view is essential this: the grandiose, unsupportable
claims about the contents of our experience should be treated as such, only after abandoning our
misguided intuitions about consciousness can our understanding really gain traction .
Many of Dennett's critics felt that rather than explaining the tough questions at the heart
of the debate around consciousness, he instead explained them away. Nonetheless , our
experience feels like an authentic one - the things we see, touch, and hear, all seem to report to
some single entity, a mind, trapped within the confines of the skull. What if, however, that "trap"
was not much of a trap at all?
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Boundaries of the Mind
Our sense of self appears to extend throughout our body -

we recognize the legs which

ment.
help us to navigate as our own, not some independent entity that could "run off' in disagree
Are
Why then, do our intuitions lead us to view the brain as uniquely the source of our identity?
Could
we wholly misguided to think that the mind could be found in a single, discrete location?
one?
this artificial boundary drawn around consciousness, the bone envelope, be an arbitrary
Here, the most basic of questions also proves to be one of the most challenging; where
exactly is the mind? The possible responses to this issue markedly delineate the two distinct
(i.e.,
ways of conceptualizing the mind: should we think of our consciousness as being situated
located in a particular space) or distributed (i.e., delocalized in some sense). For those arguing
n
the latter, tµe separation between mind, body, and environment is an unprincipled distinctio
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998).
At first pass erasing these divisions may appear unintuitive. One notable proponent of
this view, Andy Clark, has proposed the following thought experiment to bring our natural
at the
inclinations to light. Suppose that two people, Otto and Inga, are traveling to a museum
s in
same time. Unlike Inga, Otto has Alzheimer's disease, and must therefore record the direction
reaches
a notebook. Whereas Inga "reaches into" the contents of her brain for the directions, Otto
into his notebook; the only meaningful difference being that Inga's memory is processed
internally, whereas Otto's is externalized.
Should Otto's notebook be constantly and immediately accessible to him, it would appear
and
to be functioning in an equivalent way to Inga's memory. Consequently, in treating Otto
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Inga's employment of memory as truly analogous, it follows that the boundaries of mind may
reasonable extend outward into the environment.
Other philosophers have gone even further with this line of reasoning. In the book "Out

of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of
Consciousness" , Alva Noe contends that the mind may not have any spatial location at all
(2010). Historically, the problem has been the assumption that consciousness is some sort of
process -

like digestion. Instead, he suggests that we conceive of consciousness as an activity -

like dancing.
In order to dance you need to be capable of some sort of motion. As humans, we have an
intricate musculature capable of all sorts of complex movement. Muscles in isolation, however,
don't dance ; dance is an activity, an engagement with the surrounding space. For this reason, it
wouldn't be right to say that a dance is to be found within the body. In similar fashion, the brain
may have an indispensable role in producing conscious experience, but that does not necessitate
it as the location of that experience. Rather than search within the brain for experience, we
should tum our attention outward, focusing instead on the ways in which we dynamically
engage with the environment around us.
The Neurobiological Study of Consciousness

"The Astonishing Hypothesis is that 'You', your joys and your sorrows, your
memories and your ambitions, your sense of identity and free will, are in fact no
more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated
molecules ... "
Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis (1994)
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Providing an empirical account of consciousness remains one of the great challenges of
our time -

the qualities of our experience seem inextricably outside the grasp of objective

inquiry. For this reason, much of the contemporary research on consciousness addresses the
Hard Problem only tangentially. Even still, the study of the mind has been far from a fruitless
endeavor; cognitive scientists, neuropsychologists, and the like, have made tremendous headway
in investigating a constellation ofrelated concepts (e.g., free will, artificial intelligence).
The more we are able to understand how these individual functions operate at the most
basic level, the better the whole comes into focus. In this way, the mind is like a photomosaic though it is composed of hundreds, or thousands, of discrete parts, sometimes you can only make
sense of the big picture by see_ing the relation between the parts. In many cases, these
relationships are best illustrated by examining individuals whose experience is atypical.

Damage, Disorders, and Deficits
At the onset, studying subjective experience proves problematic because it is not clear in
what method it should actually be undertaken. Self-reporting appears most direct, though in
many interesting cases, one's perceptions and experiences can be radically misaligned. Take, for
example, the fascinating condition of blindsight.
Sometimes manifesting following a localized lesion or stroke within the primary visual
cortex (VI), an individual with blindsight has seemingly disconnected visual awareness from

visual attention . Patients may self-report having either partial or total blindness, while
simultaneously responding to visual stimuli; in one case study, a man with blindsight was able to
easily navigate a hallway, which unbeknownst to him, was staged with obstacles -

even
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pressing up against a wall to squeeze by a trash can - while maintaining no conscious
awareness of an ability to see his environment (de Gelder, 2008).
Blindsight illustrates how attending to a stimulus, and being conscious of that stimulus,
are not entirely synonymous . For any fan of magic this notion is far from controversial-we

are

take
often the subject of optical illusions, mental shortcuts, or subconscious priming, all of which
advantage of this discrepancy.
In other cases, the problem is not a false-report, but rather, the inability to report entirely.
with
Conscious experience exists on a gradient: ranging from those able to meaningfully engage
their environment, to others left in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) who exhibit no external
signs of mental life. Among the most troubling are the minds trapped in a nightmarish limbo
between life and death -

those with locked-in syndrome. Patients who have locked-in syndrome

they
typically have no loss of cognitive function, remaining fully conscious and aware, however
For
cannot express their thoughts due to a complete paralysis of nearly all muscles of their body.
been
many, the intactness of mind is an insufferable sort of torture, though a few patients have
Bauby,
able to find a surprising degree of purpose; in one remarkable instance, Jean-Dominique
who suffered from locked-in syndrome following a massive stroke, authored a memoir
chronicling his experience solely by blinking.
For those unable to report on the contents of their experience, functional brain scanning
(e.g., fMRI, EEG, PET) provides a glimpse into the mind's activities. With methodological
opened.
advances over the last decade, a prospective line of communication appears to have been
to
Previously, if patents bore no outward indication of awareness, they were naturally thought
of
lack any semblance of consciousness. Recent research from the lab of Adrian Owen, author
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"Into the Gray Zone: A Neuroscientist Explores the Border Between Life and Death", gained
tremendous attention when this presumption was demonstrably shown to be false. In a now
famous study published in Science, Owen took fMRI scans of a vegetative patient who was
instructed to "imagine playing tennis" and the result was astonishing: the patient consistently
showed activation in areas of the motor cortex that was homologous to the sort of activation seen
in healthy volunteers (Owen et al., 2007). Using this method, other researchers have been able to
replicate the findings with other comatose patients (Monti et al. 2010).
Nevertheless, observing activity is a far cry from observing experience. The degree of
consciousness among patients in coma, PVS, or while under anesthesia, is a very lively, ongoing
debate within medical ethics .
It is worth noting that these disturbances do not necessarily imply a deficit of some sort.
In many cases, these changes may instead be the consequence of something gained, rather than
lost. Exogenous psychotropic drugs (e.g ., mescaline, psilocybin) have been used throughout
history in medicinal and spiritual purposes because of the profound alterations in consciousness
that they produce; effects range from euphoria and relaxation to intense visual hallucinations and
feelings of dissociation.
For others, no psychoactive drugs are needed-

the same sort of mysterious disturbances

may arise organically within the brain. There is perhaps no better illustration of this phenomenon
than synesthesia. Individuals with synesthesia, known as synesthetes, have a radically different
sensory experience than others. In normal individuals, activation of the auditory pathway would
produce sound. In a synesthete, however, perceptions are often multimodal: the sound of C-sharp
may accompany the sight of a blue streak, a feeling of elation, or even the taste of strawberries.
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Little is actually known about the etiology of synesthesia, but it is thought to be the result of an
interplay between sensory pathways that are typically discrete . This sensory mixing happens in a
manner unique to each synesthete; many enchanting examples are detailed in the iconic book
" Wednesday is Indigo Blue" written by Richard Cytowic and David Eagleman, both of which are
neuroscientists who have done pioneering research in the area (2009) .
When the normal biological operations of the mind are disrupted, whether by something
lost or something gained, so too are the contents and quality of one's experience. The interface
between brain, mind, and self is an intimate one - by affecting the brain , the substrate upon
which the mind so deeply depends, changes emerge throughout the system. Once the structure of
thought and experience has been altered, dramatic modification to identity follow.
One of the most well-known illustrations of this phenomenon comes from records dating
back into the 1800's, concerning the infamous story of Phineas Gage. Having worked many
years as a foreman helping to blast rock in preparation for laying new railroads , his job was to
use a large iron rod to tamp down inert sand into holes filled with blasting powder. While his
attention was directed elsewhere, he struck a blast hole filled solely with explosives, launching
the iron rod up through his left cheekbone and out through the crown of his skull. To everyone's
surprise, he not only survived the traumatic incident, but was also able to walk with little
assistance to a nearby physician.
Gage's survival after such significant damage to the brain is remarkable by itself.
Miraculously, his mental function remained intact following the damage to his brain. The story
was made famous, however, by the changes to his temperament which followed soon thereafter.
Prior to the injury, he was well-regarded as a responsible, hard-working man . What remained
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ce was someone entirely different, a vulgar and profane man, recognizable only by appearan
so changed was he, that his friends said he was no longer Gage.
The extent to which Gage's personality changed is hard to quantify given that the
has
observations were taken so long ago. Research into the connection between mind and self
tors
only deepened in the many decades which have followed, and some contemporary investiga
have brought even more profound mysteries to light. One such investigator is Michael
Gazzaniga, perhaps most well-known for his pioneering work with split-brain patients.
In a typical individual, the brain has two distinct halves, the cerebral hemispheres,
n across
divided at the midline. Though mental functions frequently require a network of activatio
the brain, in some cases, particular operations are lateralized -

designated exclusively to one of

are
thehemispheres; the capacity to produce speech and understand language, for example,
The
functions processed within regions only found in the left-hemisphere of most individuals.
as
interface between the hemispheres is a bundle of commissural fibers, a neural-bridge, known
this
the corpus collosum. Most often, the two hemispheres work in synchrony. However, should
relationship become a toxic one, the lines of communication are broken off.
Severing the corpus collosum may serve as the last-resort intervention for those with
intractable epilepsy -

a malignant pattern of abnormal brain activity that is unresponsive to

other forms of treatment. Through a surgical procedure the aberrant hemisphere is isolated,
preventing the transmission of signals that would otherwise run rampant and wreak havoc
throughout the brain .
Though plastic and able to adapt to damage, the brain cannot fully recover from such a
of
surgery. Once severed, the two hemispheres will have forever closed-off any direct means

17
communication, each continuing to operate independently of the other. The outcome is an
interesting one: leaving not one, but two minds, each with their own unique thoughts, interests,
and preferences.
Two minds housed within one body? The notion is so strikingly foreign that reconciling
the idea with our own experience is exceptionally challenging. The discovery of this
phenomenon was the product of ingenuity at the hand of researchers, like Gazzaniga , who found
a means of exploiting the unique manner in which the brain is wired.
Absent any damage, the eyes acquire information from both the left and right visual
fields. They then transmit those signals to the brain where a single, synthesized image is
resolved. But due to a "crossing-over" of nerves at the optic chiasm, the left hemisphere receives
information from the right visual field, while the right hemisphere processes information from
the left visual field. Much of the brain operates in this contralateral fashion -

the left brain

controls the right side, and the right brain has dominion over the left. For most individuals, this
presents no issue; if one hemisphere "sees" something the other does not, it communicates that
infonnation across the corpus collosum. For split-brain patients however, it is not so
straightforward.
Only the left hemisphere is verbal (i.e., able to articulate speech and understand
language) . When interacting with a split-brain patient, the dialogue is with their left brain; the
right brain resides as a mute observer . Experimentally, researchers discovered that if you quickly
present a stimulus to the left visual field - processed by the right brain alone - then the left
brain will report not having seen anything (Gazzaniga, 2011). Though the right brain is unable to
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speak , if you give it the opportunity to act, for example by pointing with the left hand , which it
controls, then the object can still be identified.
This presents an interesting dilemma : on one hand , patients are able to physically identify
whatever object was presented, yet they verbally report not having seen anything at all. How are
these two incongruous behaviors resolved? When faced with a discrepancy of this sort, the left
brain, spares itself from any discomfort with a creative solution: tell a lie. What is most
fascinating is that it does not even realize it is lying -

instead , while desperately trying to make

sense of the experience, the brain confabulates a fictional story to account for the action.
Since only the left hemisphere is able to tell these stories, to construct the narrative, it
was coined "the interpreter" by Gazzaniga. The result is an asymmetrical relationship with its
silent partner, the right hemisphere, who learns only of the story once it has been articulated by
its overseer .
Though disturbances of consciousness offer a fascinating way to study the ways which
the mind can be altered and influenced, they stop short of yielding a holistic understanding; after
all, these sorts of conditions are rare medical oddities, a notable departure from most everyone
else's typical experience. Other lines of research have chosen to focus less on the anomalies and
more on the norm -

seeking to provide an answer for why conscious experience exists in the

first place .

Contemporary Theories of Consciousness

"Within psychology and neuroscience, some new and rigorous experimental
paradigms for studying consciousness have helped it begin to overcome the
stigma that has been attached to the topic for most of this century. "
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David Chalmers (I 99 7)

Consciousness is a Social Narrative
Though many functions are shared with other mammals, humans have a uniquely welldeveloped ability to communicate. The capacity for language and communication certainly is not
exclusive to homo sapiens, these abilities developed far earlier in our shared evolutionary
history, though our faculties far exceed what other organisms appear capable of.
Not all communication is verbal; in fact, the actual words spoken compose only a minor
fraction of what is conveyed . Subtle differences in tone, direction of eye gaze, gestures, and
body-language all influence how a message is perceived. Our innate knack for understanding
these various components has proven extremely advantageous - being able to quickly, and
accurately, distinguish a friend offering aid from an enemy threatening survival may mean the
difference between life and death.
Communication is often nuanced . Consequently, large swaths of our brain are dedicated
exclusively to this sort of social-cognitive perception, giving rise to specialized areas which help
to make sense of the complex, multimodal information . One such region is the tem_poro-parietal
junction (TPJ) -

an area of the brain located near the uppermost portion of the ear. The TPJ

tends to light up during all sorts of social perception, though is most associated with processing
that involves Theory of Mind (ToM).
Few aspects of social interaction are as essential as the ability to understand the desires
and intentions of others. Given our biological constraints, we cannot simply step-into another's
mind -

though, we can run simulations of it. Each time we try to assume a different person's
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viewpoint, we are making informed guesses about the contents of their experience, constructing
a theory of their mind.

Some theorists have suggested that this ability to understand the minds of others
eventually turned inwards. In other words, humans developed consciousness, a sort of selfawareness, once able to ascribe that same awareness to others. Research in social-cognitive
neuroscience appears to support this developmental handover; studies consistently indicate that
the TP J is activated both when attributing mental states to others and when attributing mental
states to oneself (Carrington & Bailey, 2009).
While the exact mechanistic explanation may differ between social theories, most view
consciousness as an effect of being able to interpret our own behavior. Absent this ability to
provide an explanation, our actions would become confused and random, seemingly without
purpose. It is through consciousness that a coherent narrative throughout life is forged, one that
unites separate events into a single continuous experience.
As a whole, social theories provide a good account for the presence of self-knowledge.
Critics, however, are quick to point out that self-awareness is not identical to awareness of

external events. For example, the brain may construct a narrative to explain why it avoids foul
smells (e.g., rotten things are bad), which demonstrates a certain degree of self-awareness , while
at the same time offering no account for the actual phenomenal experience; in other words, social
theories provide an explanation for the effects of consciousness, but not the experience itself.

Consciousness is Integrated Information
The brain may be the most elaborate system in the known universe; with an estimated 86
billion neurons, each synapsing with potentially up to 10,000 other neurons, the network is
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remarkably intricate (Azevedo et al., 2009). This complex biological assembly may have
s . In the
developed to meet the needs of the equally massive degree of information that it processe
ent, the
same way that sounds from different instruments fuse together in an orchestral arrangem
light,
brain unites entirely distinct sources of stimuli (e.g., electrochemical signals , photons of
,
mechanical pressure from sound waves) into a synthesized product. Underlying every action
s
each thought or feeling, lies an around-the-clock computer which gives rise to a marvelou
biological symphony: our experience .
Brains function, at least in some respects, analogously to how a computer operates:
information is received from some source, it is broken down into the simplest form for
to
processing, and the product is broadcast in some fashion. All our mental functions appear
follow this template, though we often pay the actual computations little attention - usually
taking place "under the hood", outside of our conscious awareness.
As the computations performed take on additional layers of complexity, so too may the
results . Take for example , how an image is constructed . At the most rudimentary level, details
about the orientation of lines are encoded corresponding to the presence of edges and outlines.
Familiar
Changes in the line 's position within the visual field indicate some degree of movement.
shapes and objects are recognized , and the constellation of related constructs within memory
of
guide the perception of other forms. Contrast between textures is quantified, and the qualities
of light.
color are layered onto the image proportional to combinations of particular wavelengths
effort.
All these steps are processed in parallel and without expending any degree of conscious
The field of neuroscience has laid the framework by which we may come to understand
on this
exactly how our brains accomplish feats of this sort. Tremendous progress has been made
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front; there exists now at least a basic mechanical understanding of many of the functions we are
able to perform. Given that this computational perspective has been so instructive, some have
proposed that it may similarly provide an account of the mind's most enigmatic function :
consciousness.
In 2004, Giulio Tononi proposed his Integrated Information Theory (!IT), and it has since
been recognized by notable researcher Christo[ Koch as "the only really promising fundamental
theory of consciousness". Tononi's account treats consciousness like any other mental function,
albeit an incredibly complex one, positing that it manifests from the complex integration of
information in the brain . To supplement his theory, he formalized a means of mathematically
quantifying the degree of informational integration using a value denoted as phi .
Functional brain scanning while under anesthesia seems to lend some some independent
support for IIT; the loss of conscious awareness correlates with a corresponding decrease in
global activation of neural networks within the brain . While IIT appears to present a simple,
straight-forward way of thinking about consciousness , the underlying math which substantiates
the theory is far less clear. Part of the challenge for the theory has been finding an objective way
to measure phi ; as it stands , phi appears more like a theoretical construct than a tool for actual
applied analysis.
Further , not all information is equally valuable. Through the senses, the brain collects a
astronomical amount of data and must filter through it to find what is meaningful - only a small
fraction of what is kept even makes it into conscious awareness , the rest is delegated to the
subconscious . Despite being inaccessible directly, the contents of our subconscious also undergo
a great deal of processing and inform the conscious decisions we make .
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If complex bits of information are processed and integrated at the unconscious level, why
does consciousness not result? Computers of all sorts integrate information, some at a scale far
greater than what is possible for humans -

even the internet, perhaps the most massive source

of integrated information, fails to show even the slightest sign of being endowed with a
conscious experience . Proponents of IIT would likely respond that global integration of
information is necessary for consciousness, though not sufficient since the type of information
also matters deeply. From here, the challenge only deepens: explaining exactly what special
qualities the information must have demands some understanding of the physical correlates of
consciousness, which thus far have not been discovered.

Consciousness is the Attention Schema
Novel work by the neuroscientist and philosopher Michael S. A. Graziano has given rise
to a new hypothesis, The Attention Schema Theory (AST) which appears to unite the positive
elements from other contemporary theories while also avoiding their respective weaknesses.
Graziano's new book, "Consciousness and the Social Brain" details the nuances of the theory at
length.
At the heart of AST is the idea that the brain constructs constructs schemas, an
informational model, to organize this data. Schemas of all sorts may be used to integrate
information; one of the familiar illustration of this modeling is the concept of body schema. In
each moment, the brain maintains · an internal model of the body's position in space -

arising

from the integration of proprioceptive information from the limbs. Accessing this schema helps
to coordinate and plan motion. When focus is directed outward toward an object, an apple for
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example, an informational representation of that apple is constructed (e.g., shape, location,
color).
Within other theories, the term consciousness is often used interchangeably with
attention, awareness, and experience . For AST, however, these semantic differences matter a
great deal because they concern discrete phenomena. Graziano prefers a neuroscientist's
interpretation of the term attention (i.e., a method of managing data). The brain has the ability to
exercise some control over how it allocates its resources; choosing to attend to the violinists
within a symphony orchestra entails the boosting of particular signals and the dampening of
others.
Graziano 's novel contribution is the idea that attention itself is similarly modeled in this
way. The attention schema is thus an information model of the act of attending to something. In
the same way that attention is constantly changing, so too is schema responsible for monitoring
these changes. within the attentional schema, and reporting on the current state of its focus.
This cognitive framework stems largely from the manner in which the brain manages the
"problem of other minds" -

the notion that we are immersed in a social context where we

engage with other minds, and yet have no clear way to "step-into" their experience and really
understand their inner mental life. Though we do not have direct access, knowing what others
around you are thinking poses a strong evolutionary benefit; the ability to predict another's
intentions and desires can make the difference between life and death. Humans seem to navigate
this problem intuitively by using theory of mind, which allows us to make informed guesses
based on what information is available (e.g., body language, context). In this way, the "black
box" becomes accessible by constructing a schema of their mind.
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The most controversial claim that Graziano makes is that this awareness, the model of
attention, is synonymous with consciousness. Whereas others point to the ineffable qualia which
seem to underlie subjectivity, Graziano, in line with Dennett (2017), argues that we don't
experience qualia in the way that we believe we do. In fact, the idea of experience itself is rather
a sort of "user-illusion" wherein there really is no true subjective perspective. In other words, we
have the same access problem with our own minds, and thus, what we think we know about
ourselves, and our experience, is really the result of an attribution generated from an abstract
informational model.
Crowdsourcing Consciousness

"You only exist as a pattern made up of all the other things in your life that shape
you . If you take each away, 'you ' would eventually cease to exist. This does not
mean that you do not exist at all, but rather that you exist as a combination of all
others who complete your sense of self "
Bruce Hood (2012)
The Attention Schema Theory offers an useful paradigm for thinking about the mind and
experience . By deflating the way in which think about consciousness, Graziano and many of the
other modem physicalists, make the Hard Problem tractable - by claiming there really is not a
problem at all. However, this approach is certainly contentious and divisive . The real problem, it
appears, is deciding how to navigate an epistemic dead-end. Are we correct in holding on to our
belief in qualia, the ineffable, but apparent, aspect of our experience? Or, should we rather find a
creative escape from the problem, which involves some degree of mental gymnastics, to impart a
theory which is constructive though counter-intuitive?
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Perhaps we are too quick to conflate counter-intuitive with misguided. Throughout
history, many of the ideas which challenged the status-quo of the time proved later to be most
influential. The history of thought is punctuated by radical thinkers -

consider the framework

proposed by Charles Darwin, whose Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection was a direct
contradiction of the universal understanding of much of the previous interpretation underlying
the biological sciences (1859). It took many years of criticism before Darwin's theory began to
resonate with others in the field, but it has forever changed the direction of biology since. It is
possible the same sort of frameshift will transpire from the controversial ideas proposed by
Dennett and Graziano, though only time will tell.
Thinking about consciousness through the lens of Graziano's theory does nevertheless
enact change in the present. His ideas are inescapably social in nature, and adopting them has a
direct influence on the nature of our relationships with others. The manner in which we think
about others is colored by collective social phenomena -

we infer what others may be like

based on our history of past experiences in a shared social environment. Through socialization,
through culture, and through relationships, we learn what others are like. In the same way, you
come to learn yourself. By recognizing the ways in which our experience of the world is shared,
rather than private, an emphasis is placed on interconnectedness and mutual dependence on
others. In sum, you, and I, and all others, are crowdsourced.
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REFLECTIONS

In sum, my capstone project was an exploration of the questions surrounding conscious
experience. When I first became involved in philosophy, the constellation of questions about the
mind are what most resonated with me. During my time as an undergraduate, I was fortunate to
have a broad education in both the humanities and science. This approach I had always seen as
valuable -

the ability to approach a challenging topic from multiple avenues made it more

accessible, and allowed me to better appreciate how intricate some questions could be.
While researching and writing my capstone project, I sought the same interdisciplinary
approach. This proved to be a worthwhile approach - philosophers, psychologists, and
neuroscientists alike have all independently sought to understand consciousness through their
respective fields, and thus, a rich body of research and literature was readily available. My goal
with this project was to familiarize myself with these ideas, and highlight a sort of consilience,
wherein many of the ideas and theories overlapped in constructive ways .
I chose to research consciousness, rather than say free will or artificial intelligence,
largely because of the magnitude of the problem and implications in medicine. Until somewhat
recently, the study of consciousness was considered to be a fringe topic in the sciences perhaps because of the manner in which it naturally attracts quack ideas and pseudoscience (e.g.,
we will things into existence by directing quantum energy coherence), but despite meaningful
progress, still remains on the periphery of what is acceptable. Fortunately, the study of
consciousness is working to dispel some grandiose ideas in favor of scientific reductionism,
offering serious promise for advancing the understanding areas like anesthesiology. Given that
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my intent is to pursue medicine, studying this problem in particular was a way to unite my
interests with an area of research that is both growing rapidly and gaining popularity.
Prior to beginning this capstone project, I had been fortunate to work for years as a
research assistant in the Multisensory Cognition Lab on campus. This background proved
invaluable; it armed we with a familiarity with the research process and how to best go about
finding useful information, but even more importantly, I developed a scientific lens through
which I would evaluate ideas. During my Junior year I applied for, and was awarded, and URCO
grant to conduct my own research project; for the study, I investigated Theory of Mind, the
ability to think about what other's are thinking, using electroencephalography (EEG).
Researching Theory of Mind from the perspective of social-cognitive neuroscience
proved to be more philosophically engaging than I would have expected. Consider the "problem
of other minds": we have no direct access to the minds of others, we are familiar only with our
own experience, so would it ever be possible to prove objectively that another person is
conscious? The inner mental life of others is a closed-off black box, so the brain constructs a
"theory of mind" to establish a best guess about what another may be thinking, what they may
desire, or how they will behave.
Within the sciences, the approach is to often tackle a microcosmic question -

and for

good reason, as one becomes more "big-picture" the claims made often end up more speculation
than science. However, I felt the two approaches could be more synergistic than antagonistic, so I
resolved to explore the way in which my research in neuroscience may interface with questions
about consciousness. Soon thereafter, I stumbled across a book written by Michael Graziano,

Consciousness and the Social Brain, wherein he argued that consciousness is really an attribution
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based on limited evidence (i.e ., theory of mind) and that absent a social environment , we would
not have developed this subjective perspective. After speaking with Dr. Charlie Huenemann, we
decided this would be an interesting question to research further for my capstone.
When first beginning my capstone, I hadn't yet developed a concrete theory or thesis
statement. At most, I had a vague interest in the ideas presented in Graziano's book. Without any
clear direction in mind, the initial research proved challenging; Dr. Huenemann and I were able
to identify plenty of interesting books and articles, and although reading through them all was
certainly worthwhile, it was not always clear what sort of connection I should be looking for, so
it was tough to gauge my progress.
Whereas I had initially set out to explore this one particular question mind and consciousness may be intimately interconnected -

how theory of

I instead dedicated only a small

section to that topic in my actual capstone. In outlining my ideas, I wrote a brief history of the
main theories and problems with the study of consciousness throughout time; as it turned out, I
enjoyed this much more than focusing in on just one aspect of the question. Consequently , I
resolved to broaden my focus, choosing instead to write about consciousness generally.
The end product was a synthesis of my undergraduate career . I gained an appreciation for
the overlap between the many fields in which I was interested in, and synthesize them into a
concise theory which I had long sought. In early April, I was able to present this theory during a
20-minute talk at The Science of Consciousness, an interdisciplinary research conference held
each year. After may presentation, I received very positive feedback and constructive ideas about
future directions. Finally, I was able to network with medical school faculty, most notably the
director of the Center for Consciousness Science at the University of Michigan Medical School.
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